trading against U.S. intervention with Leahy's (1995) results on the positive profits of U.S.
intervention. Saacke (1999) extended LeBaron's results using Bundesbank data and examined the profitability of intervention for both the U.S. and Germany. Sapp (1999) used U.S. and Bundesbank data and explored whether other macroeconomic and financial variables help explain technical trading rule profits. Other studies have looked at the effects of actual or reported intervention with higher frequency data (e.g., Goodhart and Hesse (1993), Peiers (1997) , Chang and Taylor (1998) , Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) , and Beattie and Fillion (1999) ).
No paper, however, has carefully considered the timing of the correlation between intervention and the daily trading rule returns found by LeBaron (1999) .
2 This study uses highfrequency trading rule returns and five intervention series from four central banks to investigate whether intervention generates trading rule profits. The data indicate that trading rule returns precede U.S., German and Swiss intervention, casting doubt on the hypothesis that intervention generates technical trading rule profits for these cases. On the other hand, trading rule returns in the AUD/USD do appear to lag Australian intervention. The direction and timing of intervention and trading rule signals makes it implausible that intervention generates trading rule returns even for the AUD/USD, however. Rather, intervention is correlated with trading rule returns because monetary authorities intervene in response to stem short-term trends from which trading rules have recently profited. these data start on 1/1/86 and end on 12/29/95. 4 Finally, the U.S. intervention data involves inmarket transactions in the DEM/USD and Japanese yen/U.S. dollar (JPY/USD) markets from 7/1/83 to 12/31/98. 5 In each case, the starting and ending dates were chosen to maximize the sample size for which intervention data and intraday exchange rates were available. Table 1 displays the summary statistics in millions of U.S. dollars for the five intervention series. As these intervention series have been described in previous papers, I will note only three points. Panel A of Table 1 shows that almost all intervention series are positively serially correlated. That is, purchases of dollars tend to be followed by purchases of dollars. Panel B
shows that the unconditional probability of intervention varies from 43 percent for the Australian series to less than four percent for Swiss intervention. Interventions also tend to cluster together in time. The conditional probability of intervention on day t, given intervention at t-1, varies from 27 percent for Swiss intervention to 75 percent for Australian intervention.
One fact that stands out is that all the purchases are small compared with the $1.5 trillion daily turnover in all currencies in the global foreign exchange market (Bank for International dollars by the Bundesbank. Skeptics of the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention have long cited the small size of intervention, relative to the flow of foreign exchange (Edison (1993) ). To the extent that this argument is correct, it argues against the hypothesis that intervention could generate trading rule returns. 6
Daily exchange rates and interest rates
To correspond with the U.S., German and Swiss intervention series, this paper uses the noon New York (1700 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)) buying rates for the USD against the DEM, JPY, and CHF from the H.10 Federal Reserve Statistical Release. 7 The daily exchange rate corresponding to the Australian intervention data was the AUD/USD exchange rate collected by the Reserve Bank of Australia at 4:00 p.m. Eastern Australian Time, 0600 GMT.
Daily interest rate data are from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), collected at 0900 GMT. Australian interest rate data were unavailable over an extended sample so returns for this exchange rate were calculated exclusive of interest differentials. These exchange rate and interest rate series have been described in Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997) and Neely and Weller (2000) ; summary statistics are omitted for brevity.
Intraday exchange rates
The use of daily exchange rates almost inevitably leaves some ambiguity about the timing of 6 Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) counter this argument with a model in which small amounts of intervention can reveal central bank information to private parties, influencing the exchange rate. 7 Intraday exchange rate collection times will be presented in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT)-also called Universal Time (UT). Table 2 translates GMT into the local time of the location of the intervening monetary authorities. The H.10 data are used for the DEM, JPY and CHF exchange rates, rather than the Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) data used by LeBaron (1999) , because the time of collection of the DRI data changes in mid-sample. The DRI data were collected at the New York open (9:00 am New York time) prior to October 8, 1986, and at 11:00 am New York time (the London close) after October 8, 1986. Because most U.S. intervention occurs during the New York returns and intervention. To address the timing question, four sets of intraday exchange rates have been assembled from daily exchange rates series observed at different times during the day.
Data availability necessitated slight differences among the four sets of intraday data. In choosing daily series for inclusion in the intraday data set, a tradeoff was made between maximizing the number of observations per day and retaining the possible greatest time period for the intraday data. This strategy permitted six observations per day for the DEM/USD and CHF/USD, at 0600, 1000, 1400, 1600, 1700 and 2200 GMT. The JPY/USD had one more observation per day, at 0800 GMT. The Australian data were limited to three observations per day, at 2300, 0600, and 1600 GMT. 8 For each intervention series, a maximum sample in which the intervention series, the daily exchange rate and the intraday exchange rates all exist was selected. Thus, the samples varied for each intervention series. Time spans ranged from 10 years for the Swiss intervention in CHF/USD to 15 years, 6 months for the U.S. and German cases.
The data were filtered mechanically to remove obvious outliers-characterized by consecutive six-or-more standard deviation changes in opposite directions-and then rechecked visually. The largest number of outliers was four, for the JPY/USD series. The Data Appendix describes the sources of the intraday data more fully. Table 3 shows the summary statistics on the log changes in percentage terms. Note that in the computation of the summary statistics, if the observation at t+1 was missing, the return at t was calculated as the return from t to t+2. The series with the highest percentage of missing observations was the AUD/USD data collected at 2300, which had six percent fewer morning, the break in the timing of collection of DRI data creates special problems in determining the temporal ordering of returns and intervention. 8 Describing the time of collection of the intraday exchange rate data in GMT is an approximation. The data were collected during specified local times, which were then translated into GMT without allowance for daylight savings time changes. Thus, actual times of collection in GMT could vary by an hour from those described. For purposes of this paper, the approximation is not important.
observations than the AUD/USD series collected at 1600.
Despite the irregular nature of the intraday data, the return statistics were grossly similar for each series within an exchange rate set. Most of the mean changes are less than one basis point.
There does seem to be some tendency for "overnight" returns-those from 1600 or 1700 GMT to 2200 or 2300 GMT, when European markets are closed-to be slightly larger than other mean returns. The Newey-West−corrected t statistics, with a five-period window, suggest that although these overnight returns are generally very small-in the 1 to 2 basis point range-they are still statistically different from zero. These small overnight returns might simply be compensation for interest differentials rather than anomalies, however. The fact that the DEM/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD overnight changes are negative while the AUD/USD changes are positive supports this explanation; the dollar would be expected to depreciate against the relatively low interest DEM, JPY and CHF but appreciate against the high interest AUD. The largest daily seasonality found is in the JPY/USD series; returns from 0800 to 1000 are about 2 basis points while those from 1000 to 1400 are almost −4 basis points. All the results would be robust to the exclusion of the JPY/USD series collected at 1000. The small mean returns imply that the irregular nature of the data does not introduce any seasonality that would be significant for this paper's results.
DAILY RETURNS AND INTERVENTION

Daily Return Results
Before exploring the temporal pattern of trading rule returns with intraday data, let us first review the results with daily returns and intervention for this sample. For continuity with the previous literature, this paper will follow LeBaron's (1999) 
The variables i t * and i t denote the daily interest rates on foreign and U.S. investments, respectively. The total excess return, r, for a trading rule during the period from time zero to time T is the sum of the signed daily returns:
Panel A of Table 4 shows the mean annual return, standard deviation, t-statistic, Sharpe ratio and trades-per-year from using an MA 150 trading rule on each of the five samples. The rule makes positive returns in all five samples, ranging from 8.72 percent per annum for the 9 Sapp (1999) has shown that intervention/return results are not overly sensitive to the length of the moving average employed in the technical trading rule. 10 The signals generated by the moving average rule could depend on whether the exchange rate is defined as dollars per unit of foreign currency or units of foreign currency per dollar. In practice, however, the correlation in the signals generated by the two methods exceeds 99 percent, and the returns are nearly identical. Neely (1998) The row labeled Markov p-value shows the chance that randomly removing returnsassuming that intervention follows a Markov process-would lower the return as much as removing actual intervention observations, assuming that intervention follows a Markov process.
The only case in which the Markov p-value indicates an insignificant relation between returns and intervention is that of the Swiss intervention in the CHF/USD market: it has a 4.4 percent annual return after removing intervention and a Markov p-value of 0.29. The sign of the relation is consistent with other results, however, and the failure to obtain a statistically significant fall in return might simply reflect the poor power of the test statistic in the presence of relatively sparse probably do not much exceed 5 basis points for a large institutional trader and that the rules trade from five to eight times a year, the annual returns net of transactions costs would be 25-40 basis points lower, still well above zero. 12 Note that the timing of the daily data (1700 GMT for the DEM/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD, 0600 for the AUD/USD) includes all Australian, German and Swiss business hours in the return from observation t-1 to t, but only half of the U.S. business day.
Swiss intervention and a shorter sample.
Some of the strongest results are in the AUD/USD market, which has not been previously studied in this context. Removing Australian intervention periods from March 1985 through June 1999 reduces the annual return from 2.44 percent to -2.27 percent. Other strong results are generated by removing Bundesbank intervention in the DEM/USD market from July 1983 through December 1998. This procedure, which reduces the annual return from 6.03 percent to only 1.28 percent, confirms the results of Saacke (1999) and Sapp (1999) using Bundesbank intervention data over other samples. Predicted returns were constructed by regressing daily trading rule returns on leads and lags of an indicator variable for non-zero intervention:
where I t+j is an indicator variable taking the value one if there is any intervention on day t+j. The resulting regression coefficients ({a 0 +b j } j=-2 2 ) are the predicted returns in the 2 days prior to, on the day of and in the 2-days after intervention. The horizontal axis of Figure 1 is labeled in hours from the beginning of the intervention day in GMT; the dating convention has made the returns backward looking in the figure. For example, because the USD, DEM and JPY daily data were collected at 1700 GMT, the predicted return from t-1 to t coincides with the label 1700 for those cases. Similarly, the predicted return from t to t+1 coincides with the label 41 and the return from t+1 to t+2 is labeled 65. 13 The vertical lines in each panel denote the business hours of the day for each of the four intervening countries. U.S. business hours are from 1300 to 2100 hours 13 24 hours after 1700 would be 41 in the notation of the figure.
GMT; German and Swiss business hours are 0600-1400 GMT; Australian business hours occur during -0200 to 0600 GMT.
On the whole, Table 4 and Figure 1 confirm LeBaron's (1999) finding that high technical trading rule returns tend to be correlated with periods of intervention. The results-using a broader sample of intervention series and different time periods-are similar to those found by LeBaron (1999) in U.S. data, Szakmary and Mathur (1997) in multinational monthly data or by Saacke (1999) and Sapp (1999) in U.S. and German data.
14 Figure 1 clearly illustrates the correlation between days of intervention and technical trading rule returns. The coarseness of the daily data makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding temporal patterns in the data, however. For example, because the U.S. returns both from t-1 to t and from t to t+1 could be influenced by intervention at t, these daily data cannot tell us the temporal ordering of the high returns and the intervention.
INTRADAY RESULTS
Definition of returns with intraday results
Intraday returns are calculated as the log change from one intraday price to the next, but exclusive of overnight interest differentials. That is, the ith return on day t is calculated as:
where S i,t is the ith observation on day t of the foreign exchange price of USD. Intraday returns whose initial observation occurred at or after the time of daily exchange rate collection day t but before the collection time on day t+1 are signed with the day t signal from the MA 150 rule.
15
Returns to a trading rule over a sample are the sum of signed intraday returns. It should be emphasized that these are intraday returns-several hours long-not simply daily returns recorded at different times of the day. Table 5 displays the annualized trading rule statistics from signed daily returns, constructed from intraday exchange rates. 16 Comparing Table 5 with Table 4 shows that including or excluding interest differentials makes little difference to results from the data used here. All of the annualized intraday returns excluding interest rate differentials are within 75 basis points of the interest-adjusted daily results in Table 4 . The p-values for the null of zero return are only slightly higher than those in Table 4 . The largest such statistics are 0.07 and 0.17 for the Swiss and Australian cases, respectively. The similarity between Tables 4 and 5 is consistent with LeBaron's (1999) finding that the correlation between trading rule returns and intervention is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of interest income. It is also consistent with other research that suggests that interest rate differentials are approximately orthogonal to exchange rate returns (Engel (1996) ).
Tabular results with intraday data
As in Table 4 , removing daily returns from t-1 to t when there is intervention at t reduces the mean annual return in every case, though again, the size of the reduction varies. Removing
Swiss intervention from the CHF/USD return series leaves a still substantial 5.21 percent annual return, whereas removing days of Australian intervention from the AUD/USD series reduces the annualized return to -2.27 percent. The only Markov p-value greater than 0.05 was 0.32, for the Swiss case. In other words-except for the Swiss case-we can reject the null hypothesis that however, given the low frequency of trading for the MA 150 rule, this would not make much difference in the performance of the rule. 16 Calculations with daily exchange rates-exclusive of interest rates-produce very similar results, of course.
randomly removing returns would lower the mean as much as removing actual intervention.
The Temporal pattern of returns and intervention
The coarseness of the daily data-collected at noon on day t-left the sequence of returns and intervention unclear. Does intervention precede high trading rule returns, suggesting that the returns are caused by intervention? Or, do high returns precede intervention, indicating that monetary authorities react to predictable trends by "leaning against the wind?" Or, are the returns truly coincident with intervention? The use of intraday exchange rate data provides greater power to distinguish among these three cases.
A procedure similar to that used in Figure 1 is used to characterize the temporal pattern of trading rule returns and intervention. Intraday trading rule returns-where the periods are in hours rather than in business days-are regressed on leads and lags of intervention signals. That is, returns around intervention are predicted by fitted values from the following regression:
where z i,t is the {-1,1} signal from the MA 150 rule associated with the i th period on day t, r i,t is the intraday return from period i to i+1 on day t and I t-j is the j th lag of the indicator variable for non-zero intervention at t. Business hours are significant because one might reasonably assume that most intervention transactions take place during those hours. Although the U.S. authorities do not publicly release the times of intervention, Goodhart and Hesse (1993) and Humpage (1998) report that it generally occurs before the close of the London markets, at 1600 GMT. There is more information about the timing of Swiss intervention, which is publicly announced. Generally, the Swiss National Bank intervened for the first time at 1400 GMT during joint intervention with the Federal Reserve. 18 As these joint interventions often also involve the Bundesbank, one might surmise that most Bundesbank intervention in the DEM/USD markets occurs contemporaneously with SNB intervention-during the European afternoon or U.S. morning. 19 The timing of
Reserve Bank of Australia operations is less certain; the RBA specifically states that intervention may occur during non-business hours (Rankin (1998) ).
Figure 2 is consistent with Figure 1 and Tables 4 and 5 in that the backward-looking trading rule returns are usually high from -1700 to 1700 GMT on the day of interventions for the U.S., Swiss and German cases. Figure 2 also reveals patterns that were not apparent from the tables, however. Most importantly, it is clear that the highest U.S., Swiss, and German excess returns 17 Although daily seasonality was a real possibility given the heterogeneity of the intraday data series, examination of the constants showed no evidence that this affected the conclusions drawn from Figure 2 . 18 The author thanks Andreas Fischer of the Swiss National Bank for private communications regarding the timing of Swiss intervention. 19 The correlations between signed indicators of U.S., Swiss and German intervention range from 0.55 to 0.62 during the 1986-1995 sample.
precede the business hours during which intervention would be carried out. Most of the high returns are finished by 0800 GMT for the U.S. and German cases and by 1000 GMT for the Swiss case. This timing indicates that, for the German, Swiss and U.S. cases, intervention is probably reacting to predictable short-run changes in exchange rates. In other words, the apparent coincidence of intervention and trading rule returns might result from leaning-againstthe-wind behavior. We can quantify how much of the abnormal returns in Figure 2 could have preceded intervention by computing the daily returns from intraday returns from early morning to early morning-prior to the business day, instead of noon-to-noon as in Table 5 . Panel A of Table 6 shows that the unconditional results for early-morning to early-morning returns for each of the five cases are very similar-not surprisingly-to the noon-to-noon cases presented in Table 5 .
Panel B shows that removing observations in the 24 hours prior to the beginning of the intervention day reduces the mean returns substantially. But, these high returns precede intervention and therefore could not plausibly have been caused by intervention. In contrast, Panel C removes returns in the 24 hours after the beginning of the intervention day. Intervention might have preceded-and therefore plausibly caused-these returns. But, removing these returns that follow intervention still leaves significant technical trading rule mean returns. The U.S. and Swiss cases still have high mean returns (4.23 and 6.04 percent) that are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that intervention responds to strong short-term trends in the market but does not generate technical 20 As a check on the robustness of the methodology, the same figure was created for isolated interventions-those for which there was no other intervention within two days of another intervention. With 70-95 percent fewer trading rule returns.
The German intraday results from Panel C of Table 6 show that removing returns during the 24 hours after the start of the day of intervention does reduce the return on the DEM/USD trading rule to 2.18 percent. However, Figure 2 suggests that part of this reduction is caused by high returns after the business day of intervention. One can argue that such post-business returns should be excluded from the calculations because they are less likely to have been caused by intervention. Neely (2000) provides some evidence from a survey of central bankers themselves to support this proposition: 61 percent of respondents believe that the full effect of intervention is felt in a few hours or less. Panels D and E show the results of excluding returns on the business day prior to and the business day of intervention. 21 Excluding returns on the business day of intervention (Panel E) generally leaves the return to the trading rule at significant (or nearly significant) levels for the U.S., Swiss and German cases. For example, the annualized return to the trading rule, after excluding the business day of U.S. intervention, is a hefty 6.99 percent.
In contrast to the U.S., Swiss and German cases, both Figure 2 and Table 6 show that returns are high during and after Australian interventions. For the Australian case, it appears that the timing of returns and intervention alone cannot rule out the hypothesis that intervention might help generate technical trading returns. Inferring causality from such timing is highly speculative, of course. The next section examines evidence on whether the timing and direction of trading and intervention supports such speculation.
observations, results for the U.S. and Swiss cases were consistent with Figure 2 ; those for Germany showed no clear pattern and those for Australia were inconsistent with results shown in Figure 2 . 21 The notes to Table 6 provide the business hours excluded in each case. Business hours were about 12 hours long.
How might intervention contribute to technical trading profits? 22
Although the mechanism is not often fully developed in the literature, one can reason out how intervention might generate profits to trend-following trading rules. If one rules out systematically perverse effects of intervention-e.g., USD purchases leading to depreciation of the USD-two stories seem possible. First, intervention to buy dollars might generate a sustained appreciation in the value of the dollar. This would require intervention to precede the sustained appreciation and for intervention to trade in the same direction as the trading rule.
That is, when the central bank is buying dollars, the trading rule should also be buying dollars.
The second story is that intervention might temporarily delay a change in the exchange rate, permitting trading rules time to switch positions and profit by trading against the central bank.
That is, a central bank might sell dollars as the dollar is appreciating, temporarily depressing the price and allowing traders to buy dollars cheaply and profit on the resumption of the trend. Of course, this assumes that the trading rule switches positions during or shortly after the intervention. If the trading rule does not switch positions during intervention, it can't take advantage of a delayed movement.
The first story requires traders to trade with central banks. The second story requires traders to switch positions to trade against central banks. Neither story fits the facts. Table 7 shows that the MA 150 rule is usually (typically more than 80 percent of the time) trading against the position taken by central banks in periods around intervention. It appears that intervention is not likely to cause technical trading rule returns in a structural sense for any of the cases. Table 7 is consistent with the alternate explanation that central bank intervention is a response to strong trends in exchange rates. Because the MA 150 rule is a trend-following rule, the fact that central banks generally intervene against the position taken by the rule indicates that they intervene contrary to recent exchange rate changes.
Finally, one might ask if it is possible that intervention is predictable, rationally anticipated, and therefore might follow the trends (and profits) it creates. Because intervention leans against the wind, such an expectations-based story would require that expectations of intervention create systematically perverse effects. That is, expectations of official dollar purchases would have to generate a trend depreciation of the dollar, for example. This story seems implausible.
Under what conditions do these monetary authorities intervene?
The finding that intervention is correlated with returns to trading rules but apparently does not cause those returns raises the issue of what conditions prompt monetary authorities to intervene. The fact that the technical trading rules trade against intervention-that is, the rules are buying dollars when the central banks are selling dollars and vice versa-implies that central banks intervene to lean against the wind, to counter recent short-term trends in exchange rates.
Such a finding would be consistent with empirical research on intervention (Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) ), results of a survey on intervention practices (Neely (2000) ) and the public pronouncements of monetary authorities (Board of Governors (1994, p. 64) or Rankin (1998) ).
To test the proposition that intervention is a reaction to exchange rate changes, one would like to use the most recent exchange rate changes that are unlikely to be contemporaneous with intervention. For each of the five intervention series, the nearest 24 hours of intraday returns just prior to the business day of intervention are aggregated into the first lag of returns; the 24 hours of returns prior to that are aggregated into the second lag of returns and so on. For the U.S.
intervention in DEM and JPY, the last returns used to predict day t intervention end at 1000 might generate technical profits.
GMT; for German and Swiss intervention, the last such returns end at 0600; and for Australian intervention the last returns used end at 1600 GMT on day t-1. Note that it is necessary to use Australian returns data from day t-1 as the Australian business day on day t begins at 2200 GMT of day t-1.
Intervention might also be used to signal to the market that exchange rates are misaligned with their fundamental determinants. Neely (2000) finds that 66.7 percent of responding authorities stated that a desire to return exchange rates to fundamental values sometimes or always motivated intervention. A simple measure of a monthly purchasing-power-parity exchange rate is constructed with the following regression:
where S t is the foreign exchange price of dollars, P t * and P t are the foreign and U.S. price levels, 
where I t is intervention at time t, α 1 (< 0) is the lower bound on insensitivity for changes in the linear combination of explanatory variables (β'x t ) to affect I t , α 2 (> 0) is the corresponding upper bound, {φ, Φ} denote the normal density and cumulative normal density, respectively, and T 1 , T 2 and T 3 denote the sets of observations for which I t is negative, zero and positive, respectively.
Up to five lags of intervention, up to five lags of 24-hour cumulated returns and the deviation of the exchange rate were permitted for each intervention series and the models were estimated by maximum likelihood, subject to the constraint that the estimated model be stationary. 24 The best model was selected by the Schwarz criterion (SC). Table 8 displays the coefficients from the best models as well as the results of two likelihood ratio tests. Consistent with the autocorrelation found in the summary statistics, the coefficients on lagged intervention are generally positive. Coefficients on lagged returns are negativeindicating leaning-against-the-wind behavior. The coefficient on the exchange rate deviation is also negative in each case, meaning that monetary authorities tend to buy dollars when the value of the dollar is below its purchasing-power-parity fundamental measure and sell dollars when the dollar is above that measure. It is difficult to assess the economic plausibility of the ranges of inaction {α 1 ,α 2 }, because they apply to a linear combination of independent variables. It is reassuring, however, that the range of inaction is smaller for Australia, which intervened more frequently than the other authorities. The first hypothesis tested by likelihood ratio is that the coefficient(s) on the lag(s) of the exchange rate return are jointly zero. This restriction is overwhelmingly rejected in each case. The second hypothesis is that the coefficient on the exchange rate deviation is zero. The only case for which we fail to reject this restriction is that of the AUD/USD, for which the coefficient is of the correct sign but insignificant. Intervention tends to lean against the wind and to be in the correct direction to reduce misalignment.
A common problem in estimating time series relations, such as reaction functions, is structural instability. To test for structural stability in a model at a known break point, T 0 , one can estimate the model before and after T 0 and use the resulting parameter estimates, θ 1 and θ 2 , and their covariance matrices, V 1 and V 2 , to compute a Wald test statistic (Hamilton (1994) ):
Under the null hypothesis of no structural break at T 0 , the test statistic is distributed as a chisquare random variable with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters being tested.
The null of no structural break at T 0 is rejected for sufficiently high values of λ.
Wald tests for structural breaks in the middle of each sample failed to reject structural stability in every case, except that of the AUD/USD. 25 Even in this case, the qualitative inference on the coefficients over each subsample was the same as that drawn from the whole sample: Intervention is negatively related to recent trends in exchange rates and to deviations from the purchasing-power-parity fundamental means. Thus, the determinants of central bank intervention appear structurally stable. Full results are omitted for brevity.
CONCLUSION
During the last 15 years, researchers have accumulated evidence that technical trading rules can produce excess returns in foreign exchange markets. These returns cannot be readily explained by reasonable transactions costs, conventional measures of risk or data mining. For a long time, some have speculated that these trading rule returns result from official intervention. 24 There was great difficulty fitting the models for U.S. intervention with more than three intervention lags, so those results were not considered.
Many have interpreted recent research as confirming this suspicion. LeBaron (1999 ), Saacke (1999 and Sapp (1999) found strong correlations between periods of U.S. and German intervention and high trading rule returns. Szakmary and Mathur (1997) extended this research to multinational monthly data.
The primary contribution of this paper is to show that the high frequency evidence disproves the hypothesis that intervention generates trading rule profits. Instead, intervention reacts to the same strong short-run trends from which the trading rules have recently profited.
In addition to showing that intervention does not generate trading rule profits, this paper characterizes the temporal patterns of high frequency trading rule returns and intervention for Australian, German, Swiss and U.S. intervention. Positive correlations found in German and U.S. data are also present-with minor variations-in longer samples and in Australian and Swiss data. For the U.S., German and Swiss cases, the highest returns probably precede intervention by less than 24 hours. For Australia, the highest returns appear to be coincident with or follow the likely hours of intervention. However, examination of the direction of trading signals and intervention make it implausible that intervention is actually generating those returns. µ is the mean of the series, |µ| is the mean of the absolute value of the series, σ is the standard deviation of the series, min and max are the extrema, while ρ 1, ρ 2 , ρ 3 , ρ 4 and ρ 5 are the first five autocorrelations. In the bottom panel: P(I t ≠ 0 ) is the unconditional probability of intervention. P( I t ≠ 0 | I t-1 = 0 ) is the probability of a non-zero intervention at t, conditional on no intervention at t-1. P( I t ≠ 0 | I t-1 ≠ 0 ) is the probability of a non-zero intervention at t, conditional on non-zero intervention at t-1. All statistics are calculated on the basis of business days, not calendar days. 19981231 19981231 19981230 19951229 19990630 Notes: The table provides statistics on returns calculated from morning to morning, starting prior to the business day in each intervening country. The hours over which the returns are calculated for the five cases are 1000, 0600, 1000, 0600, and 1600 (of t-1) GMT. In local times, these would be 0500, 0700, 0500, 0700 and 0200, respectively. See the notes to Table 4 for definitions of obs, mean, tstat, p-value, and Markov-p. Panel A shows the results for all observations. Panel B removes the returns in the 24 hours prior to the beginning of the morning observation when there is intervention. Panel C removes the returns in the 24 hours after the morning observation when there is intervention. Panel D removes the returns during the business day prior to the day of intervention. Panel E removes the returns during the business day of intervention. Business day hours are calculated as 1000-2200, 0600-1700, 1000-2200, 0600-1700, and 1600 (day t-1) to 0600 GMT for each of the five cases, respectively. The number of observations in Panels C and D refers to the number of 24-hour periods and so need not be an integer value. Notes: The table shows the proportion of the time that the MA 150 trader and the monetary authority were on the same side of the market from two days prior to intervention to two days after intervention. For example, the third row, second column shows that MA 150 traders were purchasing (selling) dollars only 5 percent of the time before U.S. authorities purchased (sold) dollars. The timing convention is that intervention at t is contemporaneous with the trading position from t-1 to t. (8) in the text shows the likelihood function. The best models were selected from maximal lag lengths of 5 lags of intervention and 5 lags of returns by the Schwarz criterion. The top panel shows the coefficient estimates and standard errors. The coefficients on lags of intervention are labeled I1 to I5, that on the lagged return variable as R1 and the coefficient on the exchange rate deviation as XRD. The bottom panel shows the results of likelihood ratio tests for two hypotheses: 1) that the coefficients on lagged returns are zero-that the authority doesn't lean against the wind; 2) that the coefficient on the deviation from purchasing power parity is zero-that the authority does not intervene to correct misalignments. NA indicates that standard errors were unavailable as the Hessian was near singular. Australian business hours are -0200 to 0600 GMT; German and Swiss business hours are 0600 to 1400 GMT; U.S. business hours are 1300 to 2100 hours GMT. The horizontal axis shows hours before (negative) and after (positive) midnight on the day of intervention in GMT. 
